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With such eminent experts participating and the three subjects (deterrence requirements, risk- 
and responsibility-sharing, and arms control and disarmament) so inextricably linked, I asked 
myself what my specific contribution might be, and I agreed with Professor Yost that I would focus 
on the question “How should NATO’s new Strategic Concept deal with nuclear policy, strategy 
and weapons?” 
I do this from the perspective of an officer who, as I can say in all modesty, in January 1990 was 
the first who dared to write on NATO paper the recommendation to revise MC 14/3. I then acted 
as Chairman of the Military Strategy Working Group (MSWG) which developed the military input 
to NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept and its accompanying document MC 400. The present 
discussion often reminds me of that time, when people warned that we must be careful not to 
“open Pandora’s box,” and I replied: “It is already open, haven’t you noticed?” In 1998-1999, I 
was as a negotiator on the German side, involved in the development of the new Strategic 
Concept agreed to at the 50-year anniversary summit in Washington.[1] 
From that double experience I draw the moral right and even obligation to participate in the 
debate about a new Strategic Concept, which I would have regarded as due already for the 60-
year summit at Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009, and for which I had laid out some ideas in an essay 
for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as early as July 2007.[2] 
However, that is not the only perspective from which I look at this subject. I also do it as a military 
officer to whom it brings back many reminiscences because, as a battery commander, brigade 
logistics officer and battalion commander, I was concretely involved in German defense 
preparations, having previously served in the nuclear artillery as a cadet and lieutenant. At the 
Artillery School I once participated in a “nuclear effects advisors” course, and later I had an SAS 
(special ammunition site) to guard with my battalion. Increasingly “MAD” appeared to me as the 
fitting abbreviation for “mutually assured destruction,” I also remember presenting a book three 
years ago at the German Military History Institute: Bruno Thoß’ important work about the link 
between Alliance strategy and German security interests in the fifties and sixties.[3] This brought 
back the worries about a “battlefield Germany,” where operations accompanied by nuclear 
employment would have thoroughly destroyed much of what was to be protected against an 
invasion or to be conquered back. The author called this an “operational dilemma,” and I said it 
was much more, namely the core problem. (He mentioned the maneuver simulation “Flash Back,” 
in which in the CENTAG region 40 NATO and 170 Soviet All this was only justified because of 
the nuclear weapons were employed.)  fundamental value of freedom and the faith in the war-
preventing function of  deterrence. 
I also look at this as a German. This has to do with the last point, but also with Germany’s special 
status regarding its renunciation of nuclear weapons. This should indeed not be a reason for 
complacency or for a one-dimensional focus on disarmament, as Michael Rühle has just recently 
reminded the German political class.[4] 
Furthermore, the subject must interest me as someone active in the security policy debate in the 
public domain and for eight years responsible for higher officer education at the national and 
international levels. 
Finally, my perspective is also influenced by the fact that I am the only military member of the 
Kammer für Öffentliche Verantwortung (KÖV), the “Advisory Committee for Public Responsibility” 
which advises the Council of the Protestant Church of Germany (EKD) in all political matters, and 
which in October 2007 finalized a fundamental document on peace ethics and security policy 
questions. The first such document since 1981, it was entitled “Live from God’s Peace—Care for 
Just Peace,” and received a widespread public response.[5] At Professor Yost’s specific request I 
will tell you more about it, because here the difficulties of public diplomacy and strategic 
communication with regard to our general conference topic are perhaps more   apparent than 
anywhere else. 
So, in sum, I am more a practitioner than a nuclear “theologian”. And I am quite concerned with 
what the concept paper for this conference describes very well as “the challenge of reconciling 
the continuing need for nuclear deterrence arrangements with the political imperative to pursue 
visible and substantive measures in nuclear arms control, disarmament, and proliferation.”[6] 
On the work towards a new Strategic Concept, a few general remarks may be useful, which are 
informed not least by my experience with the former two—but particularly the first one in 1991, 
because the “revision” in 1998-1999 was a rather cautious one, responding to the very 
conservative and restrictive remit merely to “review and where necessary adapt” the existing 
document. 
This time I think that the following aspects are of importance: 
• A “clean sheet approach” should be pursued, which does not exclude taking on board 
what is still valid in the extant Strategic Concept. This does not mean radically 
changing everything, but on the other hand it does mean doing more than just editing 
and wordsmithing.  
• Before any drafting, much homework must be done as a prerequisite. This means that 
Allies have to come to terms with the differences that divide them. Against the warning 
that developing a new Strategic Concept will be “a very divisive process” I can only 
ask: Are we not so divided on many counts that a “uniting endeavour” is urgently 
needed?  
• Important subjects for the new Strategic Concept— and for, first, re-establishing strategic 
consensus—are: redefining the purpose and role of NATO; a strengthened 
Transatlantic link; a new balance between Article 5 and the expeditionary orientation; 
more efficient cooperation with the EU; a new base for NATO’s relationship with 
Russia; harmonized views about today’s security challenges, including some newer 
ones such as global terrorism, cyber security, piracy, energy security and the question 
of NATO’s involvement in all these; furthermore: Partnership issues, enlargement, 
NATO’s regional vs. global character—and, of course, the nuclear issues, 
underpinned, in my view, by a more conceptual discussion on the role of military force 
in the 21st century.  
• Already the process of harmonizing views among Allies while working towards a new 
Strategic Concept would contribute to convincing the public of the continuing need for 
deterrence.  
• Regarding the method I think back to the MSWG, which in 1990-1991 had to do very 
innovative, creative work. Food-for-thought papers (“point papers”) were produced for 
topics where innovative thinking was required. Those included themes such as future 
risks, crisis management, force build-up capability, multinationality, reinforcement 
options, future tasks of armies, navies and air forces, flexibility, sustainability, 
cooperative security, arms control, and nuclear policy. These papers were drafted, 
discussed, offered to the national capitals and, on the basis of instructions, discussed 
again and amended. When they appeared sufficiently “mature,” they were, without 
seeking time-consuming final consensus, passed to the Strategy Review Group (SRG) 
on the political side of the Headquarters. Much of the innovative content of the 1991 
Strategic Concept was produced in this fashion.  
• Many of the subjects mentioned above as important for the new Strategic Concept would 
lend themselves to such a process. In addition, in 1990-1991, the North Atlantic 
Council conducted so-called “NAC brainstorming sessions” on individual topics. 
As for the nuclear issues: In 1990-1991 they had to be seriously discussed, but in 1998-1999 the 
Allies anxiously avoided proposals to “open the bag” and decided to mainly use the language 
from the 1991 Strategic Concept. The attempts by two governments (Canada and Germany, the 
latter with its just-installed “red-green”—that is, SPD-Green—coalition) to introduce a “no-first-
use” policy were unsuccessful, but reinforced this caution. 
This time it will not be possible to avoid a profound debate for various reasons: 
• Doubts about the continuing validity and effectiveness of deterrence with suicide 
bombers striving for death, as the discussion often goes;  
• Proliferation and the threatening breakdown of the NPT regime;  
• Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its successful procrastination with the international 
community;  
• The concrete arms control initiatives announced by the new U.S. administration;  
• The vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world (proclaimed by the two “gangs of four”; 
Kissinger with Shultz, Perry and Nunn, and then his friend Helmut Schmidt with 
Weizsäcker, Genscher and Bahr);[7]  
• Finally, President Obama embracing and supporting this vision (who, however, made 
provisos, saying that he would probably not see this happen in his lifetime, and that, as 
long as nuclear weapons existed, the United States would keep a safe, secure and 
effective arsenal);[8]  
• Also, in Germany, the debate has started again after President Obama’s April 2009 
announcement. Jumping on this train, several politicians have asked that the U.S. 
nuclear bombs stored in Germany for use by German TORNADOs be withdrawn—as if 
advance concessions of this kind could bring forward negotiations about the much 
higher numbers on the Russian side. This raises the whole question of “nuclear 
participation,” which the Federal Government thought it had put to rest when an 
inconspicuous affirmative note had been inserted in the 2006 Defence White Book.[9] 
In the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO addressed nuclear policy and strategy in the last part of the 
document, where the subject was almost hidden in the chapter “Guidelines for the Alliance’s 
Forces,” and there in the sub-chapter on the “Alliance’s Force Posture,” with the headline 
“Characteristics of Nuclear Forces.” There the following aspects are addressed: 
• The fundamentally political purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies: “to preserve peace 
and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfill an essential role by 
ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response 
to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational 
option;”[10] 
• The nuclear forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France and their 
contribution “to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies;”[11]  
• The need, as a “demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war 
prevention,” for “widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective 
defense planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory 
and in command, control and consultation arrangements,” with “nuclear forces based in 
Europe and committed to NATO” as “an essential political and military link between the 
European and the North American members of the Alliance;”[12]  
• The maintenance by the Alliance of “adequate nuclear forces in Europe,” which “need to 
have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be 
perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war,” 
and which “will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and 
stability.”[13]  
• It is reiterated that “the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to 
be contemplated” by Allies are “extremely remote,” and the reduction and re-targeting 
steps taken by NATO thus far are recalled. That is, “NATO’s nuclear forces no longer 
target any country.”[14] 
Much of this is still valid. But NATO must be conscious of the increased difficulty to address—to 
use the formulation from the concept paper once more—“the challenge of reconciling the 
continuing need for nuclear deterrence arrangements with the political imperative to pursue 
visible and substantive measures in nuclear arms control, disarmament, and proliferation.” 
Before I talk about the issues to be discussed and to be reflected in the new Strategic Concept, 
let me come back to my example with the Protestant Church Advisory Commission because it 
particularly well illustrates this difficulty—and I can tell you that participating there as the only 
soldier did not always carry an amusement tax. 
The intense discussion over three years resulted in the EKD (Protestant Church of Germany) 
Peace Memorandum “Live From God's Peace—Care For Just Peace”—where on the one hand I 
“lost,” because in its condemnation of nuclear weapons the Committee, and then the Council of 
the Protestant Church, went further than in previous times: 
109) Ethical judgments about nuclear weapons have always been controversial in German 
Protestantism. Yet faced with the system of nuclear deterrence that emerged between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact following the Second World War, the peace ethics of most 
West German Protestant churches recognized "participation in the attempt to safeguard 
peace in freedom by the presence of nuclear weapons as still being a possible Christian 
way of acting today." During the Cold War, it was assumed that rational consideration of 
the risks by both sides would protect against the outbreak of a nuclear war. Deterrence 
requires an opponent who is susceptible to rational calculation, and that can no longer be 
taken for granted today. In this context, the arguments against deterrence have become 
significantly stronger. (...) 
And, later in the document it is stated that: 
(162) (…) The suitability of nuclear deterrent strategy has now become questionable (see 
above …). From the point of view of Protestant peace ethics, the nuclear weapons threat 
can today no longer be seen as a legitimate means of self-defence. This statement 
consciously represents a peace ethics position that—in a changed historical context—
differs from that set out in Thesis VIII of the Heidelberg Theses of 1959 (see above …). 
That is where I “lost.” But I insisted on the following: 
There is still not agreement, however, as to what political and strategic conclusions are to 
be drawn from this agreed peace ethics position. 
The “pacifist” school then said: 
(163) According to one argument, one side's threat, as a necessary component of 
deterrence, is a consequence of its perception of the readiness of another country's 
weapons potential, and thus leads to a vicious cycle of reciprocal perceived threat. In the 
interests of the credibility of the deterrent principle, it has never been possible to separate 
the political function of nuclear weapons from the operational planning that—if deterrence 
fails—also foresees nuclear war. All experience suggests that deterrence is necessarily 
linked with further nuclear armament, rearmament and weapons modernization, which also 
includes new missile technologies. The disarmament obligations resulting from the NPT 
are still undermined if modernization is effected on the basis of reduced weapons potential. 
If the traditional nuclear powers do not take compliance with their disarmament obligations 
seriously, the NPT regime as a whole is jeopardized. In the affected governments and 
populations, double standards can lead to dangerous acts of defiance and can intensify 
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. From a peace ethics point of view, this line of 
argument demands complete nuclear disarmament. Concrete steps towards this goal 
include stopping nuclear testing and ceasing production of fissile material for weapons 
purposes, establishing nuclear weapon-free zones and disposing completely of non-
strategic nuclear weapons that date from the time of the Cold War. 
And then comes “my” part: 
(164) An alternative line of argument emphasizes that one must, even without explicitly 
threatening anyone, address potential threats—not least the threat posed by the increasing 
number of nuclear-armed states and by the danger that terrorist groups might also become 
equipped with weapons of mass destruction. To that extent, deterrence remains a valid 
principle. It is served by conventional and nuclear weapons, with nuclear weapons 
regarded as political and not as war-fighting weapons. The existence of such a potential is 
supposed to prevent a prospective adversary from attacking, blackmailing or putting 
pressure on others. This "prevention" is based on the attacker's awareness that in the 
case of the use of nuclear weapons he would have to expect unacceptable, incalculable 
damage. The risk of deterrence failing must also be responsibly thought through. But the 
dilemma would not be smaller if one were unilaterally to renounce adequately balancing 
the potential of an increasing number of nuclear powers. Rulers who are primarily 
interested in surviving and retaining power cannot necessarily be assumed to act 
irrationally. Even proponents of this line of argument do not deny the ethical postulate of 
nuclear disarmament, but they are convinced that even a world entirely free of nuclear 
weapons would be anything but stable, because nuclear weapons cannot be "un-
invented." From this perspective it is difficult to imagine how in the event of tensions the 
outbreak of a new, extremely destabilizing nuclear arms race for the new "first atomic 
bomb" could be prevented. 
Personally I am quite proud to have anchored in this fundamental peace memorandum of the 
national Protestant Church a commonly understandable explanation of NATO’s deterrence 
philosophy—leaving it to the reader to decide which approach is more realistic and 
commonsensical. 
Now a few concluding thoughts on what should be reflected in the Strategic Concept. 
It is of key significance to explain something that is clear to experts in a convincing way to policy 
makers and, simultaneously, to the public. Why simultaneously? Because many parliamentarians, 
for example, will not embrace what they might understand as right or inevitable if they think that 
they might be swimming against the stream. 
This should start with a general reflection: It is of particular conceptual importance to develop a 
better common understanding among Allies about the role of military force as well as the 
legitimacy of the use or threat of military force, given the differing views on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Robert Kagan is not totally mistaken when he compares, because of its commitment to 
multilateralism and diplomacy, Europe with Venus, and, because of its less inhibited inclination to 
use military force, the United States with Mars. [15] In peace-ethical terms, but also in 
multilaterally oriented security policy, the use of military force is regarded as ultima ratio. But this 
is often interpreted in a misguided way, as shown in translations such as “last recourse.” What is 
meant is not the “last” instrument in a series of measures, but the ultimate, i.e. most extreme 
means, whose early (measured) employment, or at least credible demonstration, may prevent 
worse developments in the future. A striking example continues to be the shelling of Dubrovnik by 
Serb artillery in the autumn of 1991. Had the international community, the United Nations, or 
NATO for that matter, been in agreement, two sorties on this artillery, or even the convincing 
announcement that such sorties would be conducted, would have given the fate of the Western 
Balkans an entirely different turn. Instead, Milosevic was continually reassured that militarily he 
had nothing to fear. Years later, intervention became unavoidable, at a much higher price, while 
hundreds of thousands had meanwhile lost their lives and homes. 
Such lessons need to be assessed among Allies and reflected in the Strategic Concept: Even 
preventive diplomacy needs a military backbone, and the “ultimate means” must always be 
demonstrably available. Excluding military options from the outset does not favor crisis 
management, dispute settlement and conflict prevention. 
In that context the concept of deterrence needs to be redefined. It may be true that “suicide 
bombers cannot be deterred.” as the conventional argument about the supposed outdatedness of 
any deterrence strategy goes. But the regimes that support them want to survive and retain their 
power. They should not be expected to act irrationally. Also, the dangers in today’s world are not 
limited to terrorism. Threats may appear or re-appear, and it is advisable to “keep some powder 
dry” and explain this in a wholly unaggressive, non-confrontational way. Certainly this discussion 
should also include the aspect that the emphasis on “deterrence by punishment” might have to 
shift to “deterrence by denial” (of options) by using defensive means and a larger panoply of 
instruments, and thus making aggression, threat or blackmail less attractive. 
Finally, the Strategic Concept should not duck the problem of prevention and preemption, but 
rather clear up the confusion of terms that reigns in this field—in the sense that prevention writ 
large is desirable, going to the root of disputes, crises and conflicts in a broad-based approach. 
This is the “broad concept of security” that NATO had already embraced in its 1991 Strategic 
Concept. Preemption is legal under international law in the face of an “imminent” and 
“overwhelming” attack (the famous Caroline criteria, formulated in 1841-1842). What is 
problematic is the “preventive” use of military force, “preventive war” in view of a presumed 
developing danger of attack. 
This seems obvious, and should be clearly stated, but a more profound discussion of the problem 
shows that after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington politicians have to assess the 
potentially apocalyptic consequences, should such attacks include weapons of mass destruction 
or “only” a radiological (“dirty”) bomb. Given such potentialities and the almost non-existent 
warning time, “self-defense” and “imminent” do not ring the same way as in the time of mainly 
conventional defense. Questions of legality and legitimacy form part of this debate. 
In this reflection it becomes clear that deterrence must be retrieved from being identified 
predominantly with the nuclear aspects. There are all kinds of instruments available—economic, 
police, surveillance, judicial and political measures. The “appropriate mix” has to be explained as 
well as the “full spectrum.” Under the political measures I would also subsume public information 
steps exposing a state that is using threats or aggression of any kind. For example, I find some of 
my Russian friends rather embarrassed by the mention of cyber attacks on Estonia. 
Indeed, how to convey and communicate deterrence messages is of the essence. Credibility and 
reassurance are the key categories here. And what apparently played a role in an earlier 
workshop cannot be underlined strongly enough: that the Alliance’s reputation gained or 
damaged in Afghanistan has a lot to do with its future deterrent power. 
The public also needs to understand that the cheap statement that “suicide bombers cannot be 
deterred” says nothing about states that sponsor or sanction aggressive or terrorist acts and that 
may well be amenable to deterrent policy. 
In the face of a swelling tide of antinuclear sentiments, thorough debate is required among Allies 
about the difference between a visionary goal and the means and steps to approach it as well as 
the realities and obstacles on the way. As an impetus for swifter reductions of nuclear stockpiles 
and as a bolster for the United States’ and the West’s credibility in insisting on non-proliferation 
the vision has its function. But it can easily create illusions in the public domain, exaggerated 
hopes and more opposition to NATO’s nuclear policy. And it makes harder the task of explaining 
to NATO member states’ publics the requirement to retain the means for deterrence as long as 
the vision is still a long-term goal on the horizon. Publics like to hear the first part of the message, 
but not what the U.S. President also said in Prague. Moreover, the task of explaining the 
difficulties of creating a nuclear-weapon-free world, such as monitoring and verification, is an 
unthankful one. 
Furthermore, as said before, it must be explained in the public debate that a nuclear-weapon-free 
world might not be inherently stable because compliance would be difficult to ascertain and 
nuclear weapons cannot be de-invented so that a conflict or international tension could always 
refuel a nuclear arms race for the (again) first bomb. 
If NATO is to maintain its minimum nuclear deterrence posture, it must, on the one hand, 
explicitly subscribe to a continuation of reducing nuclear stockpiles, preferably in a negotiated 
manner. At the same time, it would be important to reaffirm the political role of nuclear weapons 
and the principle of an intolerable and incalculable risk for an aggressor. The continuing need for 
“uncertainty in the mind of the aggressor,” at the heart of deterrence, leads to the reaffirmation 
that NATO will not establish a “no-first-use” policy, because it does not have a declared “first-use 
policy” either. But at the same time NATO should recant any warfighting option for nuclear 
weapons as alleged by critics and sometimes nourished by U.S. expert planning. In that context 
the Alliance must credibly explain how NATO’s three nuclear powers have taken—and continue 
to take—steps to fulfill their obligations from the Non-proliferation Treaty, but state that they, and 
particularly the U.S., are prepared to go further. At the same time the role of nuclear weapons in 
the hands of NATO powers vis-à-vis an increasing number of nuclear-armed states should be 
explained with self-confidence. 
Other speakers have already said what is necessary about the need for a deepened 
understanding of the requirements of deterrence and about the relevance of the full spectrum of 
policy instruments from nuclear forces to conventional military assets and non-military 
capabilities. But it is worth while to underline the requirement for burden-, risk- and responsibility-
sharing. As pointed out already in the workshop’s concept paper, the circumstances are 
changing: In an enlarged Alliance an increasingly smaller proportion of Allies is involved directly 
in the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture and opposition in some of the remaining member 
states is growing. In the context of the indivisibility of Alliance security the future forms of “nuclear 
participation” clearly need to be addressed. 
In any event, “the challenge of reconciling the continuing need for nuclear deterrence 
arrangements with the political imperative to pursue visible and substantive measures in nuclear 
arms control” (to quote the workshop’s concept paper again because it is a very fitting description 
of what is necessary) has become ever more urgent and must be taken seriously in the dialogue 
about these issues in order to produce consensual, solid and convincing statements in the 
Strategic Concept. 
The nuclear section of the new Strategic Concept cannot be dealt with in a mere drafting process. 
Not all of what I have mentioned will eventually be included in the document, but a deepened 
dialogue among Allies is needed, leading to better understanding, among governments and in the 
publics, and genuine consensus. This is also true for the subjects and sections which are closely 
linked to nuclear policy and strategy: non-proliferation, missile defense, arms control and 
disarmament—perhaps even space. 
About the Author 
Brigadier General Dr Klaus Wittmann served as a Bundeswehr officer for 42 years, during which 
he commanded a rocket artillery battalion and an armored brigade, studied history and political 
science, worked in politico-military affairs, and published widely. His last assignment until 2008 
was as Director Academic Planning and Policy at the NATO Defense College, Rome. In January 
1990 he was the initiator of NATO’s strategy reform after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He expressed 
strictly his own views in his statement, and it has been maintained in the somewhat personal way 
in which it was presented. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic 
Insights home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, 
please email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
References 
1. See Klaus Wittmann, “The Road to NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), 
A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years, Vol. 3 (Houndsmills/New York: Palgrave 2001), 219-
237. 
2. Klaus Wittmann, “Ein neues Strategisches Konzept,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 July 
2007. 
3. Bruno Thoß, NATO-Strategie und nationale Verteidigungsplanung. Planung und Aufbau der 
Bundeswehr unter den Bedingungen einer massiven atomaren Vergeltungsstrategie 1952-1960. 
München: Oldenbourg 2006. 
4. Michael Rühle, Gute und schlechte Atombomben: Deutschland muss die nukleare Realität 
mitgestalten, published in March 2009 by the Körber Stiftung, is also available in English as 
Körber Policy Paper No. 3, Good and Bad Nuclear Weapons: Berlin’s Part in Shaping Nuclear 
Reality. 
5. Aus Gottes Frieden leben – für gerechten Frieden sorgen. Eine Denkschrift des Rates der 
Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus 2007. (The English 
version is available on the EKD’s website: www.ekd.de/english/live_from_gods_peace.html.) 
6. David S. Yost, Concept paper for the workshop titled “NATO’s Deterrence Challenges,” Centre 
for Geopolitical Studies, Vilnius, Lithuania, 11-12 May 2009, 2. 
7. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of 
Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007; George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, 
Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, 15 
January 2008; and Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsäcker, Egon Bahr, and Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World: A German View,” International Herald Tribune, 9 
January 2009. 
8. Remarks by President Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009. 
9. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und 
zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Berlin 2006, p. 37. 
10. North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, par. 62, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. 
11. Ibid., par. 62. 
12. Ibid., par. 63. 
13. Ibid., par. 63. 
14. Ibid., par. 64. 
15. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New 
York: Vintage, 2004). 
 
